I. INTRODUCTION
E mployer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) is the primary source of health insurance for non-elderly workers and their families in the United States. In 2008, 163 million non-elderly individuals were covered by an ESI policy (De-Navas Walt, Proctor, and Smith, 2009) . However, there is growing concern about erosion of ESI. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, average premiums for family coverage increased 131 percent between 1999 and 2009, relative to a 29 percent increase in overall infl ation. Since 2000, the percentage of fi rms offering coverage fell from 69 to 60 percent, with small fi rms more likely to drop coverage. 2 Public policies, including changing the tax treatment of employer-paid premiums or altering incentives to purchase coverage in the individual market, may also infl uence employers' provision of health insurance. Current federal proposals seek to improve access to and affordability of health insurance among the non-elderly population by expanding Medicaid eligibility for individuals in very low-income households (up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL)), and by making tax credits available to low and middle-income households (e.g., between 133 to 400 percent of FPL) to purchase individual health insurance in national or state-based exchanges.
A key concern of policymakers is that if such policies were enacted some fi rms that currently offer health insurance would stop offering it, given the attractiveness of subsidies in the individual market and lower worker demand for ESI relative to individual coverage.
3 Four studies (Gruber, 2001; Royalty, 2000; Bernard and Selden, 2002; Gruber and Lettau, 2004) have examined the price elasticity of ESI offers using variation in tax prices and observations on workers who may be offered health insurance. Point estimates of the average tax price elasticity for ESI offers range from −0.249 to −0.648, with small employers more price-sensitive than larger fi rms. Thus, small fi rms would be more likely than large fi rms to drop this benefi t.
A few studies have estimated the price elasticity of demand for individual insurance. Gruber and Poterba (1994) examined the response of self-employed individuals to a change in the tax price resulting from the 1986 Tax Reform Act. They found price elasticities from −0.4 to −0.6, with singles exhibiting greater price-sensitivity. Marquis and Long (1995) found individual-market price elasticities of −0.3 to −0.4 in 1987−1988. Focusing on California, Marquis et al. (2006) reported elasticities of −0.2 to −0.4. Auerbach and Ohri (2006) used variation in premiums generated by state-based underwriting regulations to produce an elasticity estimate of −0.59. These studies suggest that workers who lose ESI might need large subsidies to purchase individual insurance.
We know, however, that workers have different tastes for health insurance, and that individuals who hold ESI may have different observable and unobservable characteristics from those who shop in the individual market (Monheit and Vistnes, 1999; Bernard and Selden, 2006) . Consequently, it is doubtful that estimates of take-up of individual coverage by those who currently shop for it can be applied to workers who hold ESI. Thus, we know very little about how workers who currently hold ESI would respond if their employers dropped it.
Optimally, we would investigate this issue using a "quasi-experiment" in which we observed workers who held coverage and then lost it when their employer dropped this benefi t. This would let us examine the insurance and employment decisions of these workers, such as staying in their current job and buying individual coverage, staying in their current job and obtaining coverage through a working spouse (if available), staying in their current job and becoming uninsured, or changing employers to obtain a new source of ESI. However, we know of no data that can support such an analysis. Our alternative strategy is to simulate how workers who hold ESI would respond if their employers dropped coverage and they faced the full premium for individual health insurance.
II. PLAN OF ANALYSIS
We focus on workers in non-elderly households with a single offer of ESI who are covered by employer-sponsored insurance. We simulate their take-up of individual insurance if their employers dropped ESI in four steps. First, we estimate a model to identify the factors, including the out-of-pocket (OOP) premium, that infl uence the decisions of workers with one offer of ESI to take up coverage. Second, we estimate the total premium that each worker would face in the individual market under both experience rating and community rating. Third, using our take-up model parameter estimates, we simulate whether workers who actually held ESI would buy individual insurance under both experience-rated and community-rated premiums. We repeat step three for workers of different ages, health status, and establishment sizes to evaluate variation in take-up on these dimensions. Finally, we predict how take-up would change if workers in lower-income households (e.g., between 100 to 400 percent of FPL) were offered tax credits to purchase individual health insurance. These estimates predict whether workers currently covered by ESI would purchase individual insurance if they lost access to ESI.
III. DATA
We use the most recent linked Household Component-Insurance Component (HC-IC) of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) for 1997−1999 and 2001 to estimate the take-up model. The MEPS-HC is a nationally representative survey of the noninstitutionalized, civilian population of the United States that contains individual and household-level data on demographics, employment and health status, health insurance coverage, medical expenditures and utilization. Information on each household member is collected during fi ve interviews ("rounds") covering a two-year period.
The MEPS-IC is an establishment-level survey of health insurance benefi ts. The IC sample is drawn from the Business Register, a confi dential list of U.S. business establishments maintained by the Census Bureau. 4 Conditional on offering health insurance, private establishments provide information on up to four health plans and public employers provide information on all offered plans. For each reported plan, data are collected on premiums (total, employer portion, and employee OOP) for both single and family coverage.
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The linked HC-IC is a follow-back survey of an adult's employer. For individuals in the HC who are employed during Round 1, provide employer contact information, and are eligible for the survey, MEPS surveyors match the worker's unique establishment identifi cation to the establishment identifi cation in the IC. The linked HC-IC is a valuable resource for studying health insurance decisions of workers and households since it includes comprehensive information about the workers, their dependents, and characteristics of the employer-sponsored health plans offered to them.
While the data have many advantages, one potential drawback is that only 50.2 percent of non-elderly workers in the HC who have an ESI offer and non-missing values for the explanatory variables, are linked to the IC. Given this linkage rate, we examine how those who link differ from those who do not. Workers who linked to the IC are more likely to be female and have longer job tenure. Linked workers are less likely to be union members, work for a private sector organization (versus government), or live in the Northeast (versus West). There are no differences in age, education, income, health status, or industry between workers who linked to the IC and those who did not. While these data are not nationally representative, Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin (2001) found that price elasticity estimates are not sensitive to selection into the linked sample.
We use the 2004 MEPS-HC to predict individual-market premiums for workers between ages 19-64 who held ESI. We exclude self-employed workers and workers in households with any member age 65 or older. In addition, we do not model take-up decisions of workers in dual-earner households with two offers of ESI, since these households have much greater fl exibility to switch sources if one employer drops insurance. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample of workers from the 2004 MEPS-HC. Applying population weights, our sample represents 50.1 million non-elderly ESI policyholders (112.9 million people in these households).
IV. METHODS
This section is divided into four parts corresponding to the four steps in our plan of analysis.
A. Take-Up Model Estimation
Using the 1997−1999 and 2001 linked HC-IC, we estimate a take-up model for employees in households who had one offer of ESI. Abraham, Vogt, and Gaynor (2006) showed that take-up propensities differ by a worker's household type, so we estimate separate models for single workers and workers in multi-person households with one offer of ESI. We assume the i th worker maximizes a utility function that depends on health and the consumption of other goods and services, which depend on personal characteristics, income, the price of ESI, and expected consumption of medical care of the family. We assume the worker evaluates the expected utility of several alternatives -taking up the offer, turning it down and enrolling or having dependents enroll in public insurance, and remaining insured -and selects the one that maximizes expected utility. We categorize all the "turn-down" options into a single choice. The worker will turn down the offer if the worker's household expected utility from turning down ESI is higher than from taking up the offer.
We write the take-up equation as:
The outcome is a latent variable capturing a worker's propensity to take up an offer of coverage. This propensity depends on personal characteristics and the health status of the worker and household members (X and H), household income (Y), the lowest OOP premium among the plans available to the worker through his employer (P), public insurance eligibility by children in the worker's household (A), regional variations (G), time trends (T), and unobservable factors that infl uence a worker's propensity to take up ESI (ε i ).
Although the latent variable is not observable, we observe a binary outcome for whether a household takes up ESI through the employer (1 if the worker takes up ESI, 0 if not). The price (P) of ESI coverage is a key explanatory variable in the take-up equation. Most research has found that individuals are more responsive to the OOP premium than the total premium. We use the OOP premium for single coverage for one-person households and the family coverage OOP premium for multi-person households. In both cases, we use the minimum OOP premium in a worker's set of plan options, whether or not that premium corresponds to the plan actually held. We assume that the lowest OOP premium is the binding constraint for households deciding whether to take up coverage.
Ordinary least squares estimates of the out-of-pocket (OOP) premium elasticity may be biased by omitted variables. There are two potential sources of this bias. One is that the quality of plan(s) offered by an employer may vary. We expect that higher-quality plans will cost more, both overall and to the employee, and that quality is attractive to workers. If the model does not fully capture health plan quality and quality is positively correlated with the OOP premium, then the estimated effect of the OOP premium on take-up will be biased toward zero.
Another source of omitted variables is that the OOP premium may refl ect an employer's strategy for addressing workers' preferences for health insurance. Employers may pay most of the total premium because decisive workers 6 in the fi rm prefer generous benefi ts and low premium cost-sharing. Strong worker demand for insurance would be associated with low OOP premiums, leading to an estimate of the price elasticity that is too large if the bias were not corrected. On the other hand, employers may set low OOP premiums to induce enrollment by workers who do not have strong demand for coverage to meet insurers' minimum participation requirements. This factor, which is more likely in small fi rms, would bias the price elasticity estimate toward zero (similar to the unobserved quality bias). Thus, the overall sign of the bias introduced by these potential sources of endogeneity is indeterminate and requires empirical investigation.
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To address this concern, we estimate the following equation for the OOP premium:
This equation contains the same variables as (1) (excluding P), plus an additional vector of Z variables. The requirement for identifi cation of (1) is that at least one element of Z is correlated with the minimum OOP premium but not correlated with an individual worker's decision to take up coverage.
We have three candidate instruments for the endogenous OOP premium. The fi rst is a constructed measure based on average OOP premiums reported in the full MEPS-IC. 8 We defi ne average OOP premiums for 80 unique fi rm size-industry-year cells and then merge these OOP premiums to each worker on the linked data based on fi rm size, industry classifi cation and year.
9 A worker's fi rm size and industry represent important dimensions over which premiums vary. Given higher administrative loads, small fi rms face higher total premiums than larger ones, controlling for benefi t generosity (Gabel et al., 2006) . Additionally, smaller fi rms charge higher OOP premiums to their workers in percentage terms (Morrisey, Jensen, and Morlock, 1994; Dranove, Spier, and Baker, 2000) . 10 The risk profi le of workers is also likely to vary across industries, leading to variation in premiums on this dimension (Gabel et al., 2006) .
The price of coverage also may be affected by competition in the local market for insurance. Our second instrument is the number of HMOs operating in the worker's county of residence. Finally, small employers may be able to reduce the administrative costs of providing health insurance by joining a purchasing alliance. Our third instru-ment is an indicator for whether the household lives in a state with a law that permits purchasing alliances for health insurance. To reiterate, the requirement for identifi cation is that these factors affect the OOP premium but are not directly correlated with a worker's propensity to take up coverage, conditional on being offered coverage through his employer.
The take-up equation also includes explanatory variables that capture the demand for coverage by workers' households: linear and quadratic measures of the highest age among workers in the household, an indicator for whether the worker is female, and indicators for the highest educational attainment among household members (bachelor's degree or higher, some college, high school degree, or less than a high school degree (excluded category)). Since these variables are positively correlated with the demand for medical care, we expect them to be positively correlated with the probability of taking up coverage as well (Phelps, 1973) . We control for race and ethnicity with indicators for whether the worker is white or black ("another race" is the excluded category), and whether the worker is Hispanic. We capture the strength of an individual's labor force attachment with a measure equal to 1 if the worker is employed 25 hours or more per week and 0 if not. We expect that workers who have stronger labor force attachment will be more likely to have access to ESI and take it up. We also include a variable for whether the worker is employed in the private sector (rather than in government). Since a worker is likely to consider other household members when making decisions, we include two measures of the demographic composition of the household -the number of children age 17 and under and whether the household head is married.
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Given the interrelated demands for health insurance and medical care, we include two measures of health status (H): the number of individuals in the worker's household who reported fair or poor health at the fi rst interview and the number of serious medical conditions reported by all household members. 12 We hypothesize that those in poorer health are more likely to take up coverage, given their higher likelihood of utilizing health care during the coverage period. Additionally, we expect that higher-income households, measured by the natural log of household income (Y), are more able to afford coverage and therefore more likely to take it up. A household with children eligible for public coverage may place a lower value on ESI and be less likely to take it up. We include the number of children in a household who are eligible to enroll in a public insurance program during the fi rst six months of the calendar year. 13 11 Household composition variables were omitted from the single worker take-up model. 12 The conditions were cancer, diabetes, emphysema, high cholesterol, hypertension, HIV, heart disease, stroke, asthma, arthritis, gall bladder disease, ulcer, and back problems. 13 Children's public insurance eligibility was constructed using KIDSIM, a micro-simulation model that uses comprehensive eligibility rules by state and year, and detailed information on a household's structure, income, assets, and age (Hudson, 2009 ). Because eligibility is not available in the MEPS-HC, we used actual enrollment in public insurance in the simulations. Although this will underestimate eligibility, we do not expect it to have a large impact given the small proportion of workers' households that hold ESI and have children covered by public insurance.
Finally, to control for geographic (G) and temporal (T) variation in workers' propensity to take up offered coverage, we include geographic dummies for Northeast, Midwest, and South regions (West is excluded), an indicator for whether the worker resides in a metropolitan statistical area, and year indicators (2001 is excluded).
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Using the Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests, we reject the null hypothesis that the OOP premium is exogenous, so we estimate an instrumental variables probit model. 16 We then evaluate the quality of our instruments to see if they are signifi cantly related to the OOP premium and uncorrelated with an individual's propensity to take up coverage. For both single workers and workers in multi-person households, joint F statistics associated with the instrument set are large and signifi cant (10.29 for singles, 30.81 for workers in multi-person households). Additionally, for both samples we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals using Sargan's and Basmann's over-identifi cation tests.
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The take-up model estimates are reported in Table 2 . The corresponding take-up elasticities produced by our model are -0.14 for singles and -0.11 for workers in multi-person households. These fall within the range reported by prior studies of 0 to approximately -1 (Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin, 1997; Cutler and Reber, 1998; Gruber and Washington, 2005; Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin, 2001; Polsky et al., 2005; Monheit and Vistnes, 2005) .
B. Predicting Individual Market Premiums
We consider two premium scenarios: (1) the worker pays the total premium for an experience-rated policy in the individual market, and (2) the worker pays the total community-rated premium.
18 "Experience rating" means that premiums are determined by a person's observable demographic and health status characteristics, given the claims experience of a group of people with similar characteristics or, as we do it, with a regression equation. The experience-rated premium does not fully refl ect the experience of an individual (which would also include the individual's idiosyncratic use of medical care). "Community rating" means that everyone pays the average premium. The experience 14 Descriptive statistics for the 1997-1999 and 2001 MEPS HC-IC sample can be requested from the authors. 15 We attempt to include plan design features in the take-up model but are unable to do so because too much information is missing. 16 All analyses are performed in STATA/SE version 10.0. 17 We evaluate the quality of our instruments by estimating the fi rst stage equation with OLS and running a joint F-test on the instruments. We then use STATA 10.0's overid command to evaluate whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals. 18 Current federal reform proposals require modifi ed community rating for plans offered in the individual market. Our estimates of experience-rating and pure community-rating should bound the effect of proposed reforms. However, it is important to recognize that workers with particular demographics or health status may have very different take-up propensities under the two premium-setting methods. We explore this issue in Tables 5 and 7 of the results. and community-rated premiums created a range that refl ects the widespread variation in states' regulatory environments for how premiums are set in the individual market. We assume that the experience-rated premium depends on predicted insurer payments incurred by the worker and dependents, multiplied by a loading factor that accounts for administrative costs and indirect costs associated with shopping for insurance in the individual market.
We begin by generating an indicator for whether the person had any expenditure paid by private insurance. For those with positive expenditure, we infl ate the expenditure to 2008 dollars and then take the natural logarithm of infl ated expenditure. 19 We estimate a two-part model that includes explanatory variables that are likely to be considered by plans under-writing individual policies: age, sex, age-sex interactions, race, highest education of a household member, total household income, geographic region, metropolitan statistical area, an indicator for fair/poor health status, and a set of indicators corresponding to whether the individual reported having cancer, diabetes, COPD, asthma, anxiety/depression, or is obese (bmi>=30). 20 Results are reported in Appendix Table 1 . Next, we predicte log insurer payments for each worker and use Duan's smearing estimator to re-transform the predicted log dollars to dollars (Duan, 1983) . Then we aggregate the predicted individual expenditures to the household level.
Next, we apply a loading factor of 60 percent to account for both administrative costs and "shopping costs" that would be incurred by a worker's household searching and applying for health insurance in the individual market. 21 Finally, we impose a price fl oor of $500/$1,000 (for singles/multi-person households) and a ceiling of $10,000/$20,000 (for singles/multi-person households) to address low and high outliers. Although price fl oors and ceilings typically would not be used under pure experience rating, we impose them to better refl ect rating methods in "real-world" insurance markets. 22 The 19 It is well known that expenditures reported in MEPS are, on average, smaller than expenditures reported in the National Health Expenditure Accounts. Sing et al. (2006) and Selden and Sing (2008) estimated a 21 percent to 24 percent difference between MEPS and NHEA private insurer payments. Given our focus on the ESI-covered population only, we adopt an alternative strategy by adjusting for insurer payments by age and sex categories to align the MEPS with a convenience sample of claims from large employers. These factors are based on the MarketScan database and were provided to the authors by Zuvekas and colleagues at the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. 20 Estimation of the expenditure model accounts for the complex sampling design of the MEPS. Unfortunately, we cannot account for the correlation of expenditures among members of the same household. However, we are able to use a robust variance estimator. Both parts of the expenditure model are statistically signifi cant. Given the complex survey design and use of survey commands in STATA 10.0, we do not have a goodness of fi t measure for the fi rst part of the model. For the second part (natural log of private insurer expenditures conditional on positive expenditure), the R-square is 0.18. 21 We assume a 40 percent adjustment for administrative costs and 20 percent for "shopping costs." The latter is based on Marquis et al. (2006) . We also consider a shopping cost multiplier that varies by the health status of the worker's household to refl ect the possibility that healthier workers may incur higher shopping costs given their lower perceived value from purchasing coverage. We assign a 30 percent shopping cost to workers reporting good, very good, or excellent health and a 10 percent shopping cost to those in fair or poor health. This change reduces the probability of take-up by healthier workers by less than 1 percentage point. 22 For example, predicted insurer payments for some workers are close to zero, but insurers do not set premiums at those low levels.
price fl oor is binding for 23 percent of the sample, while the price ceiling is binding for seven percent.
23 Table 3 provides summary statistics for the predicted premiums. There is considerable variability in the distribution of predicted premiums. The average annual premium for single coverage is $3,456 under experience rating with a standard deviation of Research and Quality (2008) . 23 We test the sensitivity of the simulation results to the fl oor and ceiling assumptions in two ways: by doubling the values and by eliminating them altogether. Eliminating the fl oor and ceiling has little effect on take-up since a much larger fraction of workers' premiums decreases than increases. Doubling the values reduces the take-up probabilities from baseline with singles exhibiting a larger response than workers in multi-person households.
$3,142. The average premium for family coverage is $9,077 with a standard deviation of $6,551. 24 As a second measure of premiums, we create a community-rated premium for each worker by using the average premium for each household type.
C. Take-Up Simulation
Using data on workers who were offered and held ESI in the 2004 MEPS-HC, we predict the probability that each worker takes up coverage in the individual market. This prediction uses the parameter estimates from the take-up model described above, each worker's characteristics, and the predicted premium.
Two additional issues need to be considered. First, we assume that when a worker's employer drops coverage, the employer increases workers' wages by an amount equal to the employer-paid premium. Since information on the employer-paid premium is not available on the 2004 MEPS-HC, we use data from the 2004 MEPS-IC and impute average employer-paid premiums to each worker based on his coverage type (single or family), fi rm size (< 50 workers or 50+ workers), and one-digit industry. 25 Second, the simulations are restricted to workers who held ESI, whereas our take-up model parameters are estimated using information on all workers with an ESI offer, including those who did not hold it. Consequently, the simulation sample is not randomly selected from the workers who were used to estimate the take-up model. To address this issue of selection, we compute an inverse Mill's ratio (ϕ (X'β )/Φ (X′β ) using the observed characteristics (X) of each worker who held ESI and the parameter estimates (β) from the take-up equation. We incorporate this selection-correction term into our take-up simulations to account for unobservable factors of the ESIcovered workers (e.g. strong tastes for health insurance coverage) that might infl uence take-up.
D. Tax Credit for Purchasing Individual Insurance
Current federal reform proposals include tax credits for purchasing individual insurance for those who lack an ESI offer and who earn less than 400 percent of FPL. The value of the credit would vary by individual and would equal the difference between the full premium in the individual market and a specifi c share of the worker's household income. 26 We check for cases in which the estimated individual premium absent any tax credit is less than the maximum premium the household could be required to pay. 24 The values of our constructed premiums fall between the average premiums reported by the most recent Kaiser Family Foundation/HRET Employer Health Benefi ts Survey ($4,824 for single coverage and $13,375 for family coverage) and the most recent AHIP Survey of Individual Health Insurance ($2,935 for single coverage, $6,328 for family coverage). 25 Given the positive relationship between income and the probability of taking up coverage, if employers do not increase workers' wages by the amount equal to the employer-paid premium when they drop ESI, we would expect take-up rates to be lower by about 4 to 5 percentage points. 26 We set the maximum share to start at 2 percent for those earning 100 percent of FPL and rising linearly to 12 percent for those earning 300 percent to 400 percent of FPL.
In such cases the worker would pay the full premium and there would be no subsidy. Once we calculate premiums that refl ect the availability of subsidies for lower-income workers, we repeat the steps to compute the predicted take-up probability.
V. RESULTS

A. Baseline Take-Up Estimates
We begin by presenting the average predicted take-up probability for each worker type (single workers and workers in multi-person households) at baseline for both experience-rated and community-rated premiums. These results are found in the third column of Table 4 . We estimate that between 69.0 and 77.4 percent of workers who currently hold ESI would be willing to pay the full, experience-rated premium. There are some notable differences in take-up behavior under community rating. In particular, single workers' take-up probability falls by almost seven percentage points. This is not surprising since these workers are likely to be younger and healthier on average, and would face considerably higher community-rated premiums.
B. Take-up Probabilities by Health Status, Age, and Establishment Size
The fi rst set of results in Table 5 compares take-up probabilities of workers in fair or poor health with those in excellent, very good, or good self-reported health. Single workers in fair or poor health are particularly likely to have stronger demand for cov- Table 4 Baseline Take-up Probability, by Worker Type erage. However, because these workers have higher-than-average expenditures, they are more likely to face barriers to fi nding affordable coverage in the individual market. The baseline take-up for single workers in fair or poor health under experience rating is lower than for workers who report being in good or excellent health (69.7 percent versus 61.2 percent). The difference is more pronounced for workers in multi-person households (78.0 percent versus 68.4 percent). Under community rating, we fi nd almost no difference (77.1 percent versus 75.5 percent). The middle section of Table 5 presents differences in take-up by age category (< 45 years, 45-54 years, and > 55 years of age). At baseline, there is an inverse relationship between age and take-up of individual coverage when individuals face experience-rated premiums for their age group. For example, 73.5 percent of single workers under age 45 would take up coverage, whereas only 58.4 percent of those ages 55-64 would do so. Not surprisingly, the differences in take-up by age are much smaller under com- Table 5 Baseline Take munity-rating. However, the take-up of single workers under age 45 falls by almost 12 percentage points under community-rating. Similar patterns are observed for workers in multi-person households, although the magnitudes are somewhat smaller. It is well documented that small fi rms are more sensitive than large fi rms to the price of offering health insurance. 27 As a result, workers in small fi rms may be more likely to lose ESI because of rapid premium growth or public policies that increase the attractiveness of the individual market compared with ESI. But, once dropped, would these workers have a different probability of taking up individual coverage than large-fi rm workers who were dropped? The bottom of Table 5 summarizes average take-up probabilities for covered workers in small establishments (50 or fewer employees), compared with workers in large establishments. We fi nd similar ranges of baseline probabilities for small-establishment workers (61.8 to 78.9 percent) and large-establishment workers (61.6 to 77.0 percent).
C. Take-Up Estimates Given Individual Market Premium Subsidies
The tax credit would make coverage modestly more affordable under both premium scenarios. Take-up increases by 2 to 6 percentage points across the worker types (Table  6 ). This modest effect is expected since the tax credit is available only to lower-income workers (it phases out at 400 percent of FPL, approximately $41,600 for a single worker). Workers who have an ESI offer are likely to have higher income (Abraham, DeLeire, and Royalty, 2009) and are therefore less likely to benefi t from the tax credit. Table 7 summarizes average take-up probabilities by health status, age, and establishment size, given the availability of tax credits. The tax credit would lead to modest increases in take-up by workers in fair/poor health, but a sizeable percentage would still not purchase coverage in the individual market in the absence of a mandate. The tax credit would offset some of the decline in take-up rates by younger workers, but the effects are modest (1.5 to 3.5 percentage point increase, depending on rating). The tax credit increases take-up among older workers (55-64 years) by 2 to 5 percentage points across the rating scenarios and worker types. Finally, workers in small establishments have lower wage income on average than workers at larger establishments. Given this, small-establishment workers would benefi t more from the tax credit. The average take-up probability increases by 2-5 percentage points for small-establishment workers, although the magnitudes are not much larger compared with workers at large establishments.
Overall, results from the simulations suggest that the availability of income-based premium tax credits as currently proposed will have only modest effects on the probability that a worker who previously held ESI will purchase coverage in the individual market. Notably, since workers who hold ESI coverage tend to have higher incomes, only a portion would qualify for the premium tax credit. To encourage higher rates of take-up among this segment of workers, policymakers could expand the eligibility criteria to levels above 400 percent of FPL or increase the generosity of the tax credit for those between 200-400 percent of FPL. While more generous tax credits would be expected to reach a larger proportion of dropped workers, this would be costly. Moreover, it would likely result in a subsidy to workers who would have been willing to pay the full premium anyway. A related option would be to increase the generosity of the tax credit but to specify the maximum number of years for which it could be taken. This could be particularly useful to workers who lose their insurance, but who do not see a corresponding increase in their wages.
A second strategy would be to expand public insurance programs. Our model results indicate that workers in households that have children eligible for Medicaid or CHIP are much less likely to take up ESI. Expanding coverage to include working parents of children enrolled in Medicaid or CHIP is one possible strategy, as is raising the income threshold so that more children could be enrolled if they lost dependent coverage through a parent's employer.
Third, strategies that reduce administrative or shopping costs associated with purchasing individual insurance would make health insurance more affordable for households that lose ESI. State-based exchanges are designed to do this; however, there is very little evidence to conclude confi dently that exchanges will reduce premiums enough to induce a signifi cant increase in take-up by workers shopping for individual insurance.
VI. LIMITATIONS
Our study is subject to six key limitations. First, the two-part insurer payment model we use to construct premiums does not control for characteristics (e.g. deductible, coinsurance) of the employer-sponsored plans these workers hold, since that information is not collected on the public-use version of the MEPS-HC. Also, the public-use version Notes: Each worker's predicted probability of take-up was computed using the take-up model parameter estimates, each worker's characteristics, and a selection correction term. Workers in households earning between 100 to 400 percent of FPL qualify for a tax credit. The credit equals the difference between the full predicted premium in the individual market and a specifi c share of the worker's household income, ranging from 2 percent for those at 100 percent of FPL to 12 percent for those earning 400 percent of FPL. Averages probabilities are reported for each category with standard deviations in parentheses. of the MEPS does not identify the individual's state of residence. Consequently, we cannot capture state-level factors -such as the regulatory environment or competition in insurance markets -that could affect premiums in the individual market. Second, we have limited ability to measure the barriers that individuals face in shopping for coverage in the individual market. These include costs of searching, requesting and completing applications, and undergoing medical underwriting (in some states). We attempt to quantify these costs with a monetary equivalent based on Marquis et al. (2006) , but we recognize this may not fully capture the cost of shopping in the individual market.
Third, the variation in OOP premiums that we use to estimate the take-up model is considerably smaller than the total premium that individuals would face in the individual market. So, while our parameter estimates are based on small changes, we are simulating large changes in premiums as individuals move from ESI to the individual market.
Fourth, when a worker moves from ESI to the individual market, he is likely to face a much higher price for insurance due to differences in the tax treatment of health insurance and loading fees. We expect that workers will react to this price increase by purchasing less-expensive policies (e.g., high-deductible policies). However, estimates of the size of the change in spending are not available for the individual insurance market. 28 In addition, the change in spending cannot simply be modeled as a lower premium, since any decrease refl ects a change in the value of the policy as well. Consequently, we were not able to model the change in coverage as workers move to the individual market.
Fifth, in addition to facing a higher price for insurance, workers may have different types of plans available in the individual market. Whereas employers can use their purchasing power to improve the quality of plans they offer to their workers, individuals do not have such bargaining power when purchasing coverage on their own. Moreover, absent a mandate to purchase coverage, insurers may respond by developing products that discourage "bad risks" from enrolling (e.g., building very narrow networks of specialists). In turn, this could affect workers' valuation of the products and their subsequent take-up.
Finally, when an employer drops ESI the worker has another alternative for obtaining coverage in addition to purchasing it in the individual market: he may switch to a job that offers health insurance. As a result, our estimates are an upper bound on the number of workers with one offer of ESI who would become uninsured if their employers dropped ESI.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This is the fi rst study to consider what would happen to workers who have ESI if their employers dropped this benefi t. This is a policy-relevant question, given the gradual decline in ESI offer rates, as well as the prospect of insurance reforms that may accelerate this trend.
Between 69 and 77.4 percent of dropped workers would be willing to pay the full premium for an experience-rated individual health insurance policy, and between 61.7 and 77.0 percent would pay the full community-rated premium. Baseline take-up probabilities differ by the worker's household type, age, and health status. However, simulated take-up does not differ between workers in small and large establishments. Tax credits for low-income workers to purchase individual insurance would have a modest impact on workers who are dropped from ESI because low-income workers are much less likely to have an offer of ESI and take it up. 
